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LEND ME AN EAR: GRADUAL OCCUPATIONAL HEARING 
LOSS AND RECOVERY UNDER THE THEORY OF CONTRA 
NON VALENTEM IN MCCARTHY V. ENTERGY GULF 
STATES, INC. 
Leigh Hill∗ 
The recent Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal case, 
McCarthy v. Entergy Gulf Sates, Inc., addresses several issues 
involved in situations where plaintiffs are injured in the course of 
their employment, but are unaware of this injury and its 
accumulation until many years, if not decades, later.1 The Third 
Circuit first addresses the issue of contra non valentem and how it 
applies to this injury, gradual in nature. The third circuit further 
discusses, though not in as great a detail, the questions of 
contributory negligence and exclusivity of a remedy in Workers’ 
Compensation, both of which are found not to apply to this case.  
I. BACKGROUND 
While this litigation began with three original plaintiffs, only 
two plaintiffs took part in this appeal: Alexander Valerie, Jr. and 
Milton Pharr.2 Valerie and Pharr were employed at the Nelson 
Station Facility of Entergy/Gulf States (EGS) and undisputedly 
suffered hearing loss between the time of their employment and 
their respective retirements from EGS.3 Their hearing loss was 
found to be caused by the noise levels generated at this facility and 
 ∗  Candidate, J.D./D.C.L., 2014, Paul M. Hebert Law Center, Louisiana 
State University. The author would like to thank Professor Bill Crawford for his 
patience and guidance throughout the writing process of this case note. 
 1. McCarthy v. Entergy Gulf States, Inc., 2011-600 (La. App. 3 Cir. 
12/7/11), 82 So. 3d 336, writ denied, 84 So. 3d 553 (La. 2012).  
 2. Id. at 339; see Original Brief of Appellees Milton Pharr and Alexander 
Valerie, McCarthy v. Entergy Gulf States, Inc., 82 So. 3d 336 (La. App. 3 Cir.), 
No. 11-00600-LA, 2011 WL 2700135.  
 3. McCarthy v. Entergy Gulf States, Inc., 82 So. 3d at 342.  
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EGS’s failure to provide adequate protection and information to 
Valerie and Pharr.4  
Both men spent over three decades working at this facility. 
Valerie’s employment with EGS lasted 34 years, from 1952 to 
1986.5 Pharr worked in these conditions for 36 years, from 1959 to 
1995.6 While EGS was aware of the relationship between 
industrial noise levels and the possibility of hearing loss at the time 
that the plaintiffs began working at the facility, evidence showed 
that EGS failed to acknowledge this problem until the 1970s, 
almost twenty years after Valerie and Pharr had already been 
exposed to dangerous levels of noise.7 But, even with EGS’s 
acknowledgement of this danger, the use of hearing protection did 
not become mandatory in the facility until about 1980.8 This 
mandatory policy was effectively useless, however, as it was never 
enforced, nor were employees instructed on when, where, and how 
protection should be used or why the protection was necessary.9  
EGS had Valerie and Pharr undergo multiple audiograms, 
which revealed that both employees suffered significant hearing 
loss. Valerie testified to having received a letter with this 
information stating that EGS would address the issue to the 
Corporate Occupational Health and Safety Group (COHS).10 
However, Valerie never heard anything from COHS.11 It was not 
until April 1999, when Mr. Valerie’s attorney arranged for him to 
have an audiogram that Mr. Valerie actually became aware this 
damage to his hearing.12 Pharr testified to retaining copies of his 
 4. Id.  
 5. Id. at 344.  
 6. Id. at 345.  
 7. Id. at 341.  
 8. Id. at 344.  
 9. Id. at 344, 346.  
 10. Id. at 345. 
 11. Id.  
 12. Id. at 344.  
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tests, but he did not think, nor was he told that, his hearing loss 
was related to the noise generated at the facility.13  
Judge Clayton Davis of the Fourteenth Judicial District Court 
(JDC) of Calcasieu Parish entered a judgment for plaintiffs, Mr. 
Valerie and Mr. Pharr, on the grounds that prescription had 
effectively been halted by the doctrine of contra non valentem; 
there was no evidence that either plaintiff was contributorily 
negligent for the hearing loss he suffered. Also, the court ruled that 
the Workers’ Compensation Act did not bar recovery from the 
employer in this case.  
II. DECISION OF THE COURT 
The Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit, in an opinion 
authored by Judge Peters, affirmed the decision of the Fourteenth 
Judicial District Court. The Third Circuit found that plaintiffs’ 
evidence sufficiently showed that damages had resulted from noise 
levels generated in the Nelson Station Facility and that the 
Fourteenth JDC had not abused its discretion in its findings or in 
the award of general damages. The Third Circuit further affirmed 
that neither employee was barred any recovery through 
contributory negligence or by the Workers’ Compensation Act 
exclusivity remedy.14 Moreover, the doctrine of contra non 
valentem suspended the running of prescription and plaintiffs’ 
claims were preserved and afforded remedy.  
 
 
 
 13. Id. at 346.  
 14. Generally, unintentional acts causing injury to an employee while in the 
workplace is the basis for an employee’s exclusive remedy provided under the 
Worker’s Compensation Act. Because of the nature of plaintiffs’ injuries, the 
Workers’ Compensation Act exclusivity did not bar plaintiffs from suing their 
employer for damages that would also be covered or partially covered under the 
Workers’ Compensation Act.  
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III. COMMENTARY 
 As with all lawsuits, the rules of prescription must be 
adhered to and enforced so as not to prejudice a defendant and to 
further judicial efficiency. Prescription begins to run once a 
potential plaintiff knows or should have been aware of the 
wrongful conduct, the damage this conduct caused, and the 
causation between the damage and conduct.15 The necessity of 
awareness of a connection between the damage and conduct is the 
crux of occupational disease cases. The question in these cases, 
specifically those cases in which damage caused by certain 
characteristics of a job site is gradual and diagnosis is likely to be 
made years after a plaintiff’s first exposure, is when should a 
plaintiff become aware that the exposure during employment 
caused him damage? When a plaintiff becomes aware of damages 
caused during employment, prescription begins to run.16  
 In Broussard v. Union Pacific, the Louisiana Second 
Circuit Court of Appeal analyzed a test laid out by the Supreme 
Court of the United States that provides great assistance with the 
issue of prescription in occupational disease cases involving long-
term hearing loss.17 This analysis states:  
A hearing loss not specifically related to an incident or 
trauma has no identifiable moment of occurrence. Thus, no 
cause of action can accrue with respect to a hearing loss 
that develops over a substantial period of time until the 
injury is fully evolved and an employee knows or should 
have know of the conditions and its cause. The time 
limitation for filing a cause of action for an occupational 
disease does not start until the harmful consequences of the 
employer’s negligence manifest themselves to the 
employee to the extent that a diagnosis is possible of the 
 15. Original Brief of Appellees, supra note 2, at 3.  
 16. Id. at 5. (The Louisiana Second Circuit Court of Appeal found that the 
running of prescription did not commence until the victim’s disease had been 
diagnosed and the victim had realized the relationship between his diagnosis and 
his working condition. See Broussard v. Union Pacific, 700 So. 2d 542 (La. 
App. 2 Cir. 1997)).  
 17. 700 So. 2d 542, 544.  
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injury and its causal connection to the work environment.18 
Using this test developed by the Supreme Court, it seems clear 
that the Third Circuit Court of Appeal in deciding McCarthy, 
diligently applied the principles of prescription and respected the 
delicate nature these rules have when applied to cases involving 
occupational disease. In McCarthy, plaintiffs Pharr and Valerie 
were exposed to damaging amount of noise during a span of 
approximately thirty-five years. During this time, each man’s 
hearing was affected so gradually, albeit harmfully. Therefore, he 
had no reason to believe that his hearing was deteriorating and did 
not know the cause of this deterioration until it was diagnosed by a 
physician.19  
 That fact that a relationship between damage that has been 
diagnosed or realized and the conduct that caused the damage 
requires that the doctrine of contra non valentem non currit 
praescriptio (contra non valentem) be applied in the McCarthy 
case. This doctrine halts the running of prescription against a tort 
victim who has not yet been able to bring a suit for reasons beyond 
his personal will.20 Contra non valentem should be used to suspend 
prescription in the following circumstances: 
(1) where there was some legal cause which prevented 
courts or their officers from taking cognizance of or acting 
on plaintiff’s actions, (2) where there was some condition 
with a contract with the proceedings which prevented the 
 18. Id., citing Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163 (1949). See Original Brief of 
Appellees, supra note 2, at 5.  
 19. Original Brief By Appellees, supra note 2, at 7. (Mr. Pharr testified that 
during his time with GSU he received no explanation of the importance of 
wearing hearing protection. While Mr. Pharr did received periodic hearing tests, 
the results of these tests were not explained to him by a GSU physician, nor was 
he told to seek the assistance of a specialist. Mr. Valerie, who had a very limited 
education, had also never been instructed on using hearing protection, nor had 
he been informed of the harm associated with noise exposure. Further, Mr. 
Valerie and his wife testified to having never received the results of his hearing 
tests at their home).  
 20. LA. PRAC. CIV. PRETRIAL § 6:98 (2012 – 2013 ed.). See also Benjamin 
West Janke & François-Xavier Licari, Contra Non Valentem in France and 
Louisiana: Revealing the Parenthood, Breaking a Myth, 71 LA. L. REV. 503 
(2011). 
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creditor from suing or acting, (3) where defendant himself 
has done some act effectually to prevent plaintiff from 
availing himself or his cause of action, and (4) where some 
cause of action is not known or reasonably knowable by 
plaintiff, even though his ignorance is not induced by 
defendant.21 
Mr. Valerie and Mr. Pharr did not have knowledge and, 
specifically as nonmedical professionals and because of EGS’s 
failure to provide adequate information to their employees, had no 
reason to know of the connection between the hazardous noise 
conditions of the Nelson Station Facility and their diagnosis, which 
took place decades after they began their careers at EGS.22 The 
Third Circuit points out prescription starts running “when plaintiff 
has reasonable basis to pursue claim against specific defendant.”23 
This Court further explains that it is sufficient for the inaction to be 
reasonable in order to have the benefit of contra non valentem. 24 
Until Mr. Valerie and Mr. Pharr had reasonable knowledge that the 
damage they were suffering was connected to their employment 
conditions, they had no reasonable knowledge or claim to bring in 
court. While it may be difficult to understand that plaintiffs had no 
knowledge of their hearing loss, as one would presumably 
recognize that his hearing is deteriorating, the appellate court 
emphasizes the fact that both plaintiffs are nonmedical 
professionals who were continuously exposed to noise that very 
gradually and very negatively affected each man’s hearing. The 
trial court record supports this.25  
 
 
 21. Id. at § 6:100.  
 22. See McCarthy v. Entergy Gulf States, Inc., 82 So. 2d at 343.  
 23. Id. at 344, citing Jordan v. Employee Transfer Corp., 509 So. 2d 420, 
424 (La. 1987).  
 24. Id.  
 25. Original Brief of Appellees, supra note 2, at 7. (“Moreover, [Mr. 
Valerie] did not even know he had a hearing loss until shortly before he filed a 
lawsuit.”).  
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IV. CONCLUSION 
 Occupational disease cases can present particularly 
complex issues of prescription. When an injury has accrued almost 
seamlessly throughout a span of years, determining a date of injury 
can be next to impossible. To protect victims in these instances the 
doctrine of contra non valentem acts to keep their claims alive so 
that they will not be prohibited from seeking recovery when their 
claims would have otherwise prescribed due to no fault of their 
own. This is exactly the way the doctrine worked for Messrs. Pharr 
and Valerie. The Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal 
determined that, because the evidence showed Pharr and Valerie 
had no conclusive personal or medical knowledge of their hearing 
loss until decades after their first exposure to dangerous levels of 
noise, their claims were preserved by this doctrine. Prescription on 
their claims would thus not begin until they obtained this 
knowledge and understood the connection between their loss of 
hearing and their work at the EGS facility.   
 
 
